The expansion of Indian Gaming has produced significant financial gains for Indian nations across the United States. In response to this influx of revenue, tribes have expanded their political activity, particularly in those areas that are heavily resource dependent. In this paper we argue that adopting an organized interests perspective enhances our understanding of tribal political activity. To demonstrate this, we study Indian gaming contributions received by Senators from 1990 to 2004. We apply broadly utilized theories of contribution patterns based on the value of access for a group and the cost of access to a member, focusing on ideology, access, electoral security, and constituency characteristics. Our results indicate that tribes respond to all of these factors in ways similar to more traditional organized interests.
Introduction
Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, the Indian Gaming industry has emerged by 2008 as a twenty-six billion dollar a year industry. 1 The resulting opportunity for greater financial resources for over two hundred Indian nations with gaming agreements has provided a new opportunity for Native Americans to influence government policies at the state and national level. Yet little is known about how Indian nations have utilized these newly available resources in pursuit of political objectives. In this paper we argue that we can increase our understanding of the motivations for tribal political expenditures in two ways. First, we apply modified theories of political incorporation and resource mobilization to understand the context of Indian political participation (Witmer and Boehmke 2007) . Second, we evaluate this perspective by applying to tribal nations theories developed to explain patterns of contributions to members of Congress by organized interest groups (e.g., Grier and Munger 1993) .
As scholars before us have noted, Indian nations are intriguing political actors as they can act as both sovereign nations and as interest groups when interacting with government officials (e.g., Mason 2000; Wilkins 1999 ). In addition, Indian nations are headed by elected leaders who represent the interests of members of the tribe. This is especially important when dealing with off-reservation actors including federal, state and local governments. While working with off reservation officials, tribal leaders seek to influence the policy process in a number of different ways including the provision of information, contributions to office-seekers, and the mobilization of Indian voters (Witmer and Boehmke 2007) .
While gaming is a relatively new issue among more traditional concerns for Indian nations, the potential to address these issues via lobbying and campaign contributions has greatly increased over the same time period. Thus unlike earlier eras of American Indian involvement in national politics, which were marked by limited resource availability, the current era represents a significant departure, suggesting that new approaches may be necessary to fully understand the current patterns of participation. Most useful for this study is a modified political incorporation perspective according to which tribes and American Indian organizations have moved beyond an approach that seeks to have members of the group win elections or serve in appointed positions (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984 Warren 1997 , Hero 1992 . Instead, a number of Indian nations have utilized resources now available following the advent of Indian gaming, to pursue an interest group strategy (Witmer and Boehmke 2007 , Mason 2000 , Wilkins 1999 ). This increased participation is fairly widespread, with over 100 different tribes engaging in lobbying or making campaign contributions at the Federal level just in 2000. At the same time, there exists a tension between focusing on Indian nations' sovereign rights and distinct cultures and viewing them solely through the relatively narrow lens of organized interests in the American political system.
While an emerging literature has utilized the organized interests perspective to study political activity by Indian nations, particularly for political expenditures (e.g., Skopek, Engstrom and Hansen 2005; Witmer and Boehmke 2007) , we believe that it is still underused as previous studies rarely explicitly evaluate its effectiveness for understanding tribal activities. In this paper we explore the value of this perspective in more detail by conducting regression analysis to study Indian nations' campaign contributions to all United States Senators since the passage of IGRA in 1988 IGRA in until 2004 . In particular, we rely on a well-established literature on the factors that help determine contributions by organized interests to provide a theoreticallymotivated set of explanatory variables, including Senators' institutional standing, ideology, electoral prospects and constituency. We then directly compare our results to those for the more traditional interests examined in prior work, such as businesses and labor unions.
Our results indicate that Indian nations' contributions respond to most of these factors in much the same way as do contributions from other interests while also reflecting the role of their Native constituency. These findings reinforce the value of combining existing, general theories of organized interests' behavior while also considering American Indian Nations' unique position in the American political system. Before discussing the literature on campaign contribution strategies and examining the pattern of contributions from Indian nations, however, we first discuss the politics and economics of the Indian gaming industry and different perspectives on tribal nation's political participation.
Indian Gaming and Indian Nations in the American Political System
In the 1980's high stakes bingo and other forms of gaming emerged as an alternative for cash poor Indian nations looking to pursue economic self-sufficiency. There also remains an underlying conflict between federal and state control and selfdetermination in the area of Indian gaming Witmer 2008, Light and Rand 2005; Smith 2000) . As a result of this conflict and confusion, Indian nations have an incentive to both clarify existing regulations and influence future decisions regarding Indian policy. As noted earlier, tribal governments are well suited to represent the collective interests of their members in non-tribal policy decisions.
The evolution and success of compacting in this new era of Indian-state relations has led to broad changes for Native Americans including increased awareness of the need to engage in the political process (Cornell, Kalt, Krepps and Taylor 1998; Light and Rand 2005; National Gambling Impact Study Commission 1999; McCulloch 1994) . 3 Further, the revenues obtained from Indian gaming have led to the emergence of Indian nations as important political actors in state and national politics. Corntassel and Witmer (2008) study the effect of this post-IGRA era, noting that gaming has ushered in an era of Forced Federalism, which has lead to an increase in the electoral participation of American Indians. Importantly, their surveys of Indian tribal leaders suggest that gaming and sovereignty issues are central to tribal support of candidates.
This contrasts with prior studies of American Indian political participation, which have traditionally focused on three areas: Indian activism, including protest activity and civil disobedience, legal challenges to existing law, and electoral mobilization (Corntassel and Witmer 1997) . Far fewer studies have examined the efforts of Indians and Indian organizations to lobby Congress on important Indian issues, although Cornell (1988) provides numerous examples of Indian efforts. Wilkins (1999) , in a discussion of the Navajo Nation, also addresses the role of Indian nations as interest groups, noting that "tribes themselves have over the years been active in pushing -as interest groups -to protect or enhance their treaty rights, land rights, resource rights and civil and political rights" (p. 162).
Of the research on Indian political involvement, little examines efforts to influence political decision-making through the use of campaign contributions. 4 There are two reasons for this. First, research on the political participation of groups in society has often focused on blacks and Latinos, while the political mobilization of Indian Nations and Indian organizations are often not examined (see for example Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984 ,Bobo and Gilliam 1990 , Warren 1997 , Hero 1992 ).
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Second, Indian nations often lacked the resources necessary to become active in the political process (Cornell 1988; Corntassel and Witmer 2008; Nagel 1997, Witmer and Boehmke 2007) . As a result, there were limited opportunities for Indian nations and Indian organizations to influence the decision-making of individual members through campaign contributions. It is our contention that we can gain leverage on the surge in Indian nations' participation by noting that Indian nations are incorporating into the political process in ways much different than racial or ethnic groups in society. Namely, they have been less successful than Blacks or Latinos in winning non-tribal elections or gaining appointment to positions of influence (Witmer and Boehmke 2007) . In addition, the lack of resources that has often been cited as a primary reason for limited support of office-holders (Cornell 1988 , Nagel 1997 , Nagel 1982 , Gross 1989 incorporation by utilizing an interest group strategy as we suggest, or they can participating politically in more traditional ways including activism, the courts, and electoral mobilization (Corntassel and Witmer 1997) . We believe an interest group strategy is a useful alternative for tribes with resources as it allows them to more directly participate in the policy process. In the next section we discuss theories of campaign contributions by organized interests, which will serve as the foundation for our subsequent analysis of contributions by Indian nations.
Interest Group Activity and Campaign Contributions
While there are many different methods through which interest groups attempt to influence political outcomes, one of the more important ways is through campaign contributions, which can only be made through associated political action committees (PACs) or independently by members. While the costs of administering a PAC and raising money to donate to candidates keep many groups away (Gais 1996) , about 25% of interests that lobby the government have decisions. Yet the findings regarding the effect of money on votes can best be described as mixed (see Baumgartner and Leech (1998) for an overview).
A related literature has emerged in the last two decades that studies aggregate PAC giving for different industries and classes of organized interests in order to understand broad motivations behind campaign contributions to different legislators (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Brunell 2005; Cox and Magar 2000; Gopoian, Smith, and Smith 1984; Grenzke 1989; Grier and Munger 1993; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994; Mitchell, Hansen, and Jepsen 1997; Stratmann 2002; Wilcox 1989) . The theoretical basis behind much of the literature starts with models of legislative behavior that incorporate the ability of groups to make contributions to legislators with hope of influencing that behavior. Denzau and Munger (1986) , for example, set up a formal model in which legislators must balance their actions in order to satisfy their constituents' demands, but must also raise money to help win reelection. Organized interests make their contributions in response to these decisions, responding to the needs and abilities of legislators so as to accomplish their policy goals for the smallest amount of money. In short, then, groups provide contributions to those legislators positioned to provide services at the lowest price. This price depends on a number of characteristics of a legislator, including the compatability of the group's goals with those of the legislator's constituency, the legislator's committee assignments (see also Grier and Munger 1991) , seniority, electoral need, and majority status (Cox and Magar 1999) .
Based on their arguments and the subsequent empirical literature that tests patterns of contributions by business, labor, and other sets of organized interests, we group these various considerations into three broad categories and test them in the context of tribal contributions:
electoral considerations, institutional considerations, and ideological considerations. We discuss each of these in turn, highlighting findings from empirical studies of more traditional interests and discussing how Native American interests may respond.
First, consider electoral considerations. As Grier and Munger (1986) note, legislators facing potentially close elections will likely need to raise more money and will therefore be more receptive to campaign contributions. In practice, this means that contributions flow to incumbents facing tough elections. 6 Previous studies have consistently found that legislators with tighter electoral margins receive more contributions than secure legislators (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Cox and Magar 2000; Grier and Munger 1993; Stratmann 2002) . If tribes similarly make contributions in order affect electoral outcomes, then they should focus on races that will maximize the effect of their scarce resources. Our first hypothesis is therefore that Senators facing more competitive races receive more contributions from Indian nations than their more secure colleagues.
Second, groups also make contributions in order to support their general ideological goals. Ideology has, not surprisingly, consistently emerged as an important determinant of contribution patterns in the literature, including the studies cited above. More recently, Wand (2007) finds that partisanship has played an increasing role in allocation decisions. Groups with explicit ideological motivations are obviously more likely to give to candidates that they feel will further their political agenda. For example, Grier and Munger (1993) find that partisanship has a greater effect for labor unions than for corporate interests.
Given the broad set of issues that confront Indian nations, tribal contributions are likely to depend more on where parties stand on issues of importance than on an explicitly ideological agenda. We do suspect that differences between the two major parties in the last half century, however, have led tribes to align more closely with Democrats. In particular, the current era Third, interest groups give money in order to secure access to relevant decision makers.
The value and cost of access is the central part of Grier and Munger's theory. Groups interested in policy change or in blocking policy change will seek out influence through legislators that offer the greatest return on their contributions. Rather than attempting to influence floor votes, which can be costly given the great number of legislators that may have to be persuaded in order to secure a majority, groups strategically target a small number of well-placed legislators who have the ability to shape proposals, whether during the agenda setting or committee stages.
Given the ability of individual legislators to insert or delete key clauses or to use institutional power to stall or push legislation, the return on contributions for access is likely greater that the return on contributions for votes (see also Hall and Wayman 1990) . Studies examining the effect of contributions on access are much more consistent in their findings than those that study vote decisions. Hall and Wayman (1990) find that groups that give more are able to secure greater access while Wright (1990) finds that committee members that receive a greater number of contributions are lobbied by a greater number of groups but do not vote differently than other committee members, suggesting that contributions may help groups get through the door to engage in direct lobbying but do not directly buy votes.
The value of access depends on many characteristics related to the ability of legislators to effectively work on groups' behalf. Majority party status increases legislators' ability to control committee proceedings and influence the agenda. Cox and Magar (2000) find that when control of the House of Representatives shifted to Republicans in 1994, receipts from business PACs increased by thirty-six thousand dollars; labor PACs appeared to value partisanship more than majority party status, however, as their contributions to Republicans decreased, if anything. Party leadership positions (Grenzke 1989 ) and seniority (Grier and Munger 1993 ) also allow legislators to wield greater influence. Finally, membership on important committees also increases influence for groups interested in the relevant policy area (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Endersby and Munger 1992; Gopoian, Smith, and Smith 1984; Grier and Munger 1993; Stratmann 2002) . We expect that tribes will respond similarly to these characteristics.
Further, given the context of Federal Indian policy, we expect that tribes will in particular value access to members of the Committee on Indian Affairs. This committee is charged with overseeing Federal Indian policy and as a result its members have a critical hand in making relevant policy. Our third hypothesis is therefore that Indian contributions flow to Senators that hold important institutional positions.
The final piece of the process is the cost to legislators of delivering for the contributing group. This ability depends on the extent to which a legislators' interests mesh with those of the group -when concordance is great, contributions will be more effective and action will come at a lower price. Legislator interests may be measured by shared ideological goals, but also depend more broadly on constituency characteristics. For example, agricultural PACs give more to members of Congress that have larger proportions of farm land in their districts (Van Doren, Hoag, and Field 1999) . In the context of tribal interests, then, our fourth hypothesis is that contributions will flow to Senators with greater Native American populations and more Federally recognized tribes in their states as well as to those with a greater number of tribal gaming enterprises in their states.
While the theoretical perspective developed by Grier and Munger (1986) and extended by others as described above is intended to be general in its scope, different types of groups will emphasize different strategies and value different approaches to achieving their policy goals. For example, Grier and Munger (1993) explore similar motivations and find that party and ideology are the only common determinants of receipts for Senators from corporations, labor unions and trade associations. Only labor unions' decisions appear to be motivated by electoral concerns. Cox and Magar (2000) find that the 1994 change in majority party status influences contributions from business PACs and not labor PACs whereas changes in voting record influence labor and not business PACs. Differences also exist within broad classes of groups: Endersby and Munger (1992) find that labor unions with different interests target committees appropriate to those interests. Scholars applying this theoretical perspective to more narrow interests have also found broadly similar results once the key concepts have been appropriately measured in the context of those interests, e.g., the auto industry (Hersch and McDougall 2000) , the savings and loan industry (Bennett and Loucks 1994) , and agricultural PACs (Van Doren, Hoag, and Field 1999).
We therefore expect Indian nations to respond in similar fashion, despite the complexity of the interests that they represent. With the rise of gaming, they may have taken on behavior similar to other business groups. Yet given their position as representatives of tribal members, they may be influenced more by traditional Native American concerns. In fact, Wilkins (2002) notes that Indian interest groups may display elements of both a sovereign nation and an ethnic group depending on the issue. This fits with surveys of tribal leaders who suggest that a variety of issues, not just gaming, are important considerations when they consider supporting a candidate for office (Corntassel and Witmer 2008) . In the next sections we investigate these issues using data on contributions to Senators and appropriate measures for our four hypotheses regarding patterns of contributions by Indian gaming interests.
Contributions and Senate Data
In order to test which factors influence Indian nations' contribution decisions, we Working with data aggregated by Senator, while common in the literature, does not allow us to directly test the relationship between the characteristics of individual tribes and the Senators to which they contribute, thereby limiting our ability to directly address the motivations that Indian nations have for making contributions. By studying the characteristics of the Senators that receive them, though, we can begin to draw some conclusions about the objectives of the contributors and, more importantly, follow the well established methodology in the literature to which we compare patterns of tribal contributions. 9 We return to this issue in the conclusion.
To put these data in context, there has been strong growth in contributions from Indian Over time, there is a dramatic increase in contributions, mirroring the expansion of gaming among Indian nations (Boehmke and Witmer 2004) . In every year except 1998, there is also a strong partisan bias with Democrats receiving between two and three times as much money as
Republicans.
[ Table 1 Native American population only have a correlation of 0.37).
We also include a few control variables. First, we include election cycle fixed effects to control for year-to-year changes in the environment. Note that these variables will account for possible Presidential election year effects, since the total amount of money available to Senate candidates may be reduced in the presence of a Presidential election. Second, we also control for whether a Senator is up for reelection during the current cycle. Because contributions to Senators may be focused towards the end of a term, we expect this variable to have a positive effect.
Further, we also run versions of our model that limit the analysis to these Senators, since many of the factors we study may have greater influence during this part of a term.
Since the dependent variable is the amount of contributions received and tribes did not
give any money to about 78% of the Senators during a given election cycle in our sample (this decreases to 62% among Senators up for reelection), we must account for this in our empirical model. Otherwise such a large number of zeros in the dependent variable would seriously bias the coefficient estimates from a linear regression model. We therefore follow the practice in the literature and estimate a tobit model, which accounts for this large number of non-recipients by treating them as censored. 19 That is, the model assumes that tribes would have preferred to make negative contributions to these Senators, but since they are prevented from doing so these observations enter the data as receiving zero contributions.
20

Empirical Determinants of Tribal Contributions
The results of our four tobit regressions are reported in [ Table 2 here.]
First, we are interested in whether tribal giving is driven by electoral incentives. Our results suggest they are, with tribes giving more to Senators facing an election in all four models.
More importantly, the coefficient on the Cook's call variable is positive and significant in both models in which it is included indicating that tribes give more to Senators facing a close election.
Given that these coefficients represent changes in the underlying latent variable, desired contributions, caution should be taken before translating them into actual dollars received. In order to ease interpretation of the coefficients, we convert them into changes in contributions by multiplying them by a scale factor. 22 This conversion implies that tribes give about $4025 more to Senators facing difficult reelection prospects.
Note that limiting the sample to the electoral cycles for which we have a measure of the The third factor we consider for Senate attributes is access. Examining our measures of a members' role in the Senate suggests that tribes are extremely conscious of member influence and their access to decision-making on Indian issues. Most important is party leadership: tribes give significantly more money, about $1985, to party leaders from both political parties. This effect is significant at the 0.10 level or better in all four models. Also extremely important is membership on the Indian Affairs Committee. Tribes give about $2952 more to its members and the coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level in all models.
Surprisingly, given our expectations of access to decision-makers, members of prestige committees are not so well rewarded. Members of the three money committees -Budget, Appropriations and Finance -receive $881 more than other members, but the corresponding coefficients never approach conventional significance levels. We also find no effect for majority party status, though we can only include this variable in the first model, nor for institutional position measured by years in the Senate. We do find some weak evidence of a boost in contributions to first term Senators on the order of about $2124, but this effect is only significant in the first model.
Our final hypothesis concerns the impact of tribal and Native American interests in a
Senator's state. The results in Table 2 These findings make sense, since, as we expected, Indian nations with gaming have greater resources to devote to political activities while nations without gaming may have more pressing concerns. On the other hand, the decrease in receipts as the number of Indian nations increase runs contrary to our expectations, 23 though it could be explained by the collective action problem as research by Lowery, Gray, Anderson, and Newmark (2004) finds that the rate of political participation decreases with the number of interests in a state. Gaming tribes may not face as great a collective action problem since they have greater resources and may be able to influence outcomes on their own. Previous research has also occasionally produced similarly unexpected findings, such as Endersby and Munger's (1992) finding that unions give less to
House members with more blue collar workers in their districts.
Interpretation and Discussion
American Indian political participation, at least as measured by contributions to United
States Senators, has clearly increased in the years since the passage of IGRA. Our results show that tribes respond in similar ways as more traditional organized interests. This is unsurprising in many ways, since tribes' motivations for participation in the political process overlap in many ways, particularly in the context of Indian gaming, which is, after all, a business enterprise. 
Majority Party
Senator is member of the party that holds a majority of seats in the Senate during the current election cycle. 14 We tried other measures of competitiveness based on primary and general election results from the previous election as well as challenger fundraising: lagged vote share, whether the incumbent held a safe seat (won last election with at least 55% of the vote), the number of primary challengers, and the runner-up's expenditures in the previous election. None of these alternatives produced a significant finding. Six years may be too long a time for these lagged variables to still exert an influence. 15 We also included ADA scores and found the findings varied little.
Endnotes
16 Appendix A contains definitions and sources of our variables. 17 We tried this variable both as the actual number as a percentage of total state population.
While the effects of other variables remained essentially unchanged, the number of Native Americans performed stronger than the percentage.
18 Of course, it is possible that gaming revenues are not directed based on state, but rather that they are given based on committee memberships etc. Lack of a relationship between state gaming levels and contributions is not sufficient to determine that gaming is not related to contributions. The opposite occurrence (tribes with gaming giving not to their Senators, but to
Senators from other states that also have gaming) is probably less likely, however, meaning that the existence of a relationship is almost certainly based on activity from same-state gaming tribes. As we note in the conclusion, in a small sample of tribal contributions, about 60% went to a Senator from the tribe's state.
19 Maddala (1983) explains the tobit model and explicitly derives the bias of the OLS estimates.
Also see Long (1997) for an explication of the tobit and related models. 20 Given the large number of zeros in our data, we also estimated the model as a probit regression where the dependent variable was zero for all Senators who did not receive any contributions and one for all Senators who received any non-zero amount of contributions that year. The results from the two models were quite similar. 21 This restriction makes it impossible to include a variable for majority party since there is no variation in this subsample. 22 The coefficients from the regression represent the marginal change in the underlying latent variable, y*, which is not bounded below at zero. We may be more interested in the marginal change in observed contributions, y, which, letting z=x is given by (z). Alternatively, we may be interested in the change in contributions when they are non-zero (y* > 0), which is given by [1-z((z)/(z))-((z)/(z)) 2 ]. In the context of our first model, a rough translation for our coefficients can be obtained by calculating the two scale factors at the average value of the independent variables: (z)=0.28 and [1-z((z)/(z))-((z)/(z)) 2 ] = 0.26. See Maddala (1983) for derivation of these results. In our discussion we use the first scale factor, and set continuous variables to their mean values, dichotomous variables to zero, and use 2002 as our base year.
Note that this provides a relatively low estimate since most of the dichotomous variables have large and positive effects: setting these variables to one almost doubles the reported marginal effects.
23 Since California and Alaska have about 60% of all tribal nations, we checked whether either of these two outliers was behind this finding. Excluding either one renders this variable insignificant, but excluding both produces a coefficient that is significant at the .108 level. 24 We tried to scan Senator's individual contributions, but Open Secrets only lists the top 1000. 
